Gay dating with gps
Within fifteen minutes, Hoang had identified the intersection where I live. In fact, the outline fell directly on the part of my apartment where I sat on the couch talking to him.
Ten minutes after that, he sent me a screenshot from Google Maps, showing a thin arc shape on top of my building, just a couple of yards wide. Hoang says his Grindr-stalking method is cheap, reliable, and works with other gay dating apps like Hornet and Jack'd, too.
The lingering issue, however, remains: All three apps still show photos of nearby users in order of proximity.
And unlike previous methods of tracking those apps, the researchers say their method works even when someone takes the precaution of obscuring their location in the apps’ settings.But the trick can be done almost as easily with Android devices running GPS spoofing software like Fake GPS.(That's the simpler but slightly less efficient method Hoang used to pinpoint my location.)To respond to Grindr's obscuring of the exact distance between some users, the Kyoto researchers' used a "colluding" trilateration attack.And Jack'd, despite claims to "fuzz" its users' locations, allowed Hoang to find me using the older simple trilateration attack, without even the need to spoof dummy accounts.In a statement to WIRED responding to the research, a Grindr spokesperson wrote only that "Grindr takes our users safety extremely seriously, as well as their privacy," and that "we are working to develop increased security features for the app.” Hornet chief technology officer Armand du Plessis wrote in a response to the study that the company takes measures to make sure users" exact location remains sufficiently obfuscated to protect the user’s location." Jack'd director of marketing Kevin Letourneau similarly pointed to the company's "fuzzy location" feature as a protection against location tracking.